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Abstract
The online exchange of social recognition including, for instance, the Facebook
“like” appears to produce a scarce allocation without a clear utility function defined
for anyone involved. Given the importance attached to such digital commodities by
both users and advertisers, it is of interest to study the forces governing their eco-
nomics. Here we propose a centrality measure akin to eigenvector centrality to describe
an individual’s perceived importance in an online social network. It is shown in silico
that strategically maximizing this prestige metric results in finite nontrivial rates of
“like” endowment. Furthermore, it is found that systems of reputation-seeking agents
are supported most robustly by networks with the features of real human societies
including preferential attachment and the small-world property. We conclude that the
incentive system studied here can produce realistic behavior and may therefore provide
a framework for a more general model of decision-making in online communities.
Keywords: online social networks, gift economies, social capital, centrality, scale-
free networks, preferential attachment, small-world networks, Baraba´si-Albert graphs,
agent-based modeling
I. Introduction
The rise of the Internet as a means of exchange for products and ideas raises economic
and legal challenges unlike those faced before (Castells 2000, pp. 471-475). One feature
of the “Web 2.0” economy is the new ubiquity of goods that may have significant costs
of production but can be distributed at zero or negligible marginal cost including, for
instance, digital media, software, and access to online services. In lieu of a unified in-
frastructure to allocate such goods and prevent illegal sharing (though several frameworks
have been proposed to date; see Aigrain 2012 and Fournier 2014), two distinct regimes
for the distribution of digital commodities have emerged. The first and most conventional
is strictly profit-based, mandating that consumers pay producers for content and services
either directly through payment or indirectly by being subjected to advertising (Fuchs
2009). Alternately and bafflingly from a traditional economic perspective, some creators
opt to distribute what they have produced without explicitly requiring anything in return.
Although this phenomenon is found throughout the web, it is perhaps best-documented
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as it applies to open-source software (Lerner & Tirole 2002) and digital information more
generally (Weber 2000; Curien & Muet 2004). One might reasonably ask what motivates
developers to place on the public domain their potentially lucrative software creations, the
likes of which include products as universal as Apache and Linux. It has been suggested
that online “gift economies” are impelled by an expectation of reciprocity by all members
(Veale 2003), effectively enforcing a norm of reciprocal altruism which has indeed been
shown to be stable both in nature (Trivers 1971) and in particular online communities
(Cohen 2003). Another hypothesis attempting to explain the unexpected degree of online
generosity is one of reputation, the pursuit of which has been established as a powerful
social force (Appiah 2011). Eric Raymond, a prominent proponent of the “open-source
movement,” notes that “the ‘utility function’ Linux hackers are maximizing is not classi-
cally economic, but is the intangible of their own ego satisfaction and reputation among
other hackers.” (Raymond 2001, p. 53)
Raymond’s is the model by which we will proceed in considering the exchange of yet
another intangible product without marginal cost: gratification constructs in online social
media, most significantly the Facebook “like.” The philosophical and economic exchanges
of such commodities have been described in detail in the context of the corporate accu-
mulation of social favor as a means of promotion (Arvidsson 2009; Gerlitz & Helmond
2011). “Likes” for advertising purposes, unlike goods such as open-source software, can be
valuated quantitatively as they are literally traded on a market (Bilton 2014). However,
in such markets, supply and demand are governed by the availability and costs associated
with armies of “bots” and the promotional needs of the parties who are purchasing the
online recognition. The acquisition of these “likes” thus becomes a matter of technology
and marketing rather than of the social forces to which we will direct our attention in this
work. The lack of a monetary incentive when communities of “friends” decide whether to
positively recognize the content of one another may shed light on the factors that drive
this and other gift economies.
II. Defining Social Prestige
In order to examine why “likes” are traded within social networks, one must first determine
the motivations of people in using Facebook and other social networks at all. Central pur-
poses identified in the literature include, among other things, maintaining social contacts,
surveilling acquaintances (Joinson 2008), increasing one’s credibility (Jessen & Jørgensen
2011), and improving one’s social standing (Ellison et al. 2007). We will consider only
the last of these factors in this work because it is most likely to produce economic results;
namely, while “likes” are not scarce, social capital is. It is therefore reasonable to con-
sider a system in which agents act strategically to acquire it. To do so we must develop a
method of quantifying an agent’s popularity or prestige within a network in which “likes”
are exchanged. Certainly the problem of identifying important nodes in a network has
been considered at length in the literature, producing metrics to address a wide variety
of questions including those of simple geometric features (degree centrality), each node’s
nearness to the rest of the graph (closeness and betweenness centralities) (Dehmer 2011,
pp. 12-13), and the diffusion of information and ideas (Banerjee et al. 2013), among others.
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A key requirement for the centrality measure to be defined here, to which we shall refer
as “likedness centrality,” is that to be “liked” by a prominent member of society allows
the recipient to share in the granter’s social capital. This feature is reminiscent of both
eigenvector centrality and Google’s PageRank algorithm (Brin & Page 1998). However,
we will see in the next section that these models are inappropriate as they neglect the
potential for economic inflation of gratification constructs.
Consider a social network of N nodes labeled {1, 2, . . . , N} which are arrange in an
unweighted and undirected graph G.1 The graph is equipped with an N ×N matrix R of
non-negative reals with the property that if an edge (i, j) /∈ G, then Ri,j = Rj,i = 0.2 We
shall interpret the entry Ri,j as the rate at which the jth agent “likes” content from the
ith. For fixed G, we seek to define the N -vector L(R) whose ith coordinate contains the
prominence or “likedness centrality” of the ith agent. We might proceed in parallel with
eigenvector centrality and define L(R) to be the vector satisfying
Li(R) =
1
λ
N∑
j=1
Ri,jLj(R) (1)
for the λ of largest possible magnitude. This formulation is problematic. Each agent
observes that as he “likes” more content, the recipients gain prestive, thus inflating the
value of whatever “likes” he receives in return. Since the explicit cost of “liking” content
is negligible, this would imply that any pair of rates that are not both initially zero will
increase ad infinitum, provided that agents are rational.
The fundamental issue with using this or another established centrality measure is that
they compute prominence from the standpoint of an outside observer of the network. They
are therefore unsuited to model the view from an agent’s perspective, off of which his utility
function must be based. We attempt to resolve this by allowing each individual to judge
his prestige in the network relative to the prestige of others whom he sees; namely
Li(R) =
N∑
j=1
Ri,jLj(R)
/ N∑
j=1
Gi,jLj(R) (2)
where Gi,j is the entry at i, j in G’s adjacency matrix.
3
In this model, when an agent increases the rate at which he delivers “likes,” two opposite
effects must be considered. First, as before, when the recipients’ prestige increases so does
the value of the “likes” with which they reciprocate. Second, as the total prestige of the
network’s members grows, each agent’s own prominence appears lower to him or herself by
comparison. Each member of the network must strategically balance these two competing
forces, perhaps yielding nontrivial equilibrium rates of “like” exchange.
1We focus on an undirected, unweighted graph with Facebook’s network in mind. However, one may
easily introduce asymmetry and arbitrary real values to the adjacency matrix to respectively permit directed
connections (eg. Twitter, Instagram, citation networks) and idiosyncratic degrees of interaction.
2The converse need not hold because we do not require that adjacent nodes exchange nonzero “like”
rates in both directions.
3Scaling both L(R) and R (effectively changing the unit in which the rates are measured) does not affect
the equation. Although the key results of this paper depend only on relative values of L, for the sake of
uniqueness when stating absolute values we adopt the convention of letting L(R) · 1 = 1.
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Figure 1: At left is the mean “like” rate received in return for various outgoing rates exhibited by the most
strategic of the 106 societies described in the next section. We then allow two outlying nodes to form a
coalition and “like” one another at a joint rate. The right pane shows the effect on the likedness centralities
of the coordinating agents (blue and orange) and the rest of the network (green).
III. Tit-for-tat Phenomena
One potential model for agents’ decision processes involves the reciprocity arrangement
suggested for the broader internet economy by Veale (2003). It might be supposed that
there exists a coalition of agents who can together produce a desirable outcome for the
group but individually have incentive to defect. With a distant time horizon, it has been
established that it may be nonetheless rational for individuals to coordinate their actions,
producing what may resemble quid pro quo “like” exchanges (Axelrod 2006, p. 31). In this
work we will avoid this complication by assuming throughout that the discount factor is
large, due to either the forgetfulness of the players or the transience of online social net-
works. Otherwise, this problem would resemble a repeated multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma
with a highly complex payoff matrix. As even the apparently simple two-player repeated
prisoner’s dilemma lacks an infallible best response, such a problem would be intractable.
Even when players have no concern for the prospect of future cooperation, the proposed
likedness centrality model is intrinsically able to encourage tit-for-tat play in the following
manner. If an agent is to be strategic about whom he “likes” (which he must, as “liking”
in excess diminishes his own prestige in comparison to his peers’), then he must “like”
those who would deliver the greatest payoff to him: namely, those who already “like” him
more frequently, for he gains directly from their inflated prominence. Thus reciprocity in
moderation becomes a self-enforcing behavior favorable to both parties. However, unlike
the eigenvector model, inflation occurs as the network is flooded with “likes” and those
involved in tit-for-tat exchanges begin to experience decreasing marginal returns. This
theory is robustly apparent in the simulated behavior of pairs of rational agents, shown
in the first frame of Figure 1. The second frame shows the inevitable corollary that when
cooperative strategies are allowed, it may be rational for coalitions of agents to “like” one
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another ad infinitum.4
IV. Simulating Strategic Social Agents
The model society in this investigation will be a social network randomly generated by
a Baraba´si-Albert graph distribution with N = 10 and k = 2 which is known to exhibit
realistic structural features including preferential attachment, small-world dynamics, and
clustering to a greater extent than a random graph (Baraba´si & Albert 1999). Even with
the simplification of a short time horizon as assumed in the last section, finding equilibrium
rate matrices is a matter of solving a system of 2|G| = 34 nonlinear differential equations in
as many variables. Although such a calculation might be tractable numerically on a small
number of graphs, to carry it out over a representative subset of all possible communities is
not. Instead, for each of 106 Barabsi-Albert graphs, we generate a rate matrix with entries
selected independently and at random according to an exponential distribution with λ = 1.
This allows us to rank the pairs (R,G) on a spectrum of stabilities based on the response
of Li(R) to perturbations of the ith column of R, ie. the degree to which i is motivated to
change the rates at which it endows “likes.” In particular, define the stability of a system
as
S(R,G) = exp
− ∑
(i,j)∈G
(
∂Li(R)
∂Rj,i
)2 (3)
where the sum separately counts both directions of each edge.5 When no individual has
incentive to defect, the appropriate partial derivatives vanish and the system has unitary
stability. This is the metric we will use henceforth to evaluate whether the matrix R can
be produced by rational agents over a graph G.
V. Rationality of Finite “Liking”
A central question is whether it is strategic for agents to deliver “likes” at all, and if
so whether the model presented here correctly predicts that allocation occurs at finite
rates in equilibrium. We will consider the 0.1% most stable of the 106 systems defined
in the previous section, corresponding to S(R,G) ≤ 0.00125, to be strategic. Figure 2
illustrates how over- or under-represented each strategic “like” rate interval is compared
to the random exponential population whence it is drawn. It is seen that while strategic
agents are unlikely to exhibit very low rates, they prevail among those who “like” at
rates past the 1 − e−1 ≈ 63.2 percentile. An extremum occurs at the 95.3 percentile rate
which is populated at a 52.9% greater frequency by individuals acting strategically. Agents
with rates past this peak increasingly populate unstable systems, and indeed at the 99.2
4We will not overly concern ourselves with this consequence of the short time horizon assumption because
in any real community, the rest of the network would likely recognize the quid pro quo arrangement and
the coalition’s credibility would suffer.
5Analytic methods fail to find explicit forms for likedness centrality or its gradient in all but in the sim-
plest of systems. The derivatives required in the stability formula are instead computed as finite difference
quotients by perturbing entries of the rate matrix by 1% of their values.
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Figure 2: Frequencies of various outgoing “like” rates for strategic agents relative to the random exponential
model.
percentile non-strategic agents prevail. We can therefore conclude that the systematic
pursuit of likedness centrality drives rational individuals to a finite but nonzero rate of
bestowing “likes,” as would be expected in any plausible online social network.
VI. Emergent Network Features
Because each of the sample societies considered in the simulation is arranged in an independently-
generated graph, the same dataset allows us to investigate what network features are most
likely to come about when the “like” exchange ensemble is in equilibrium. We will examine
three properties which are characteristic of realistic networks: a long-tail degree distribu-
tion, low mean graph distance, and high clustering (Albert & Baraba´si 2002). All three
are, to various extents, already present in the Baraba´si-Albert model so we wish only to
determine if strategic selection accentuates them further.
To examine the relative level of preferential attachment in strategic networks, we use
the same class of the 0.1% most stable systems from the last section. We then compute
the degree distributions for both this subset and the random population as a whole. The
frequency of each degree is compared between the two populations in Figure 3. It is seen
that the overrepresentation of the spectrum of degrees is “U”-shaped, with both its tails
occurring more frequently in strategic systems. Dramatically, fully connected nodes (of
degree N−1 = 9) are 2.11 times as common in strategic systems. Despite the intrinsic scale-
free nature of Baraba´si-Albert networks (for they are constructed using explicit preferential
attachment), an inequitable degree distribution is still more prevalent among graphs which
support equilibrium “like” rate matrices. Next we will direct our focus toward the so-called
“small-world” property which will be measured as follows. For any distinct pair of vertices
labeled (i, j), let `i,j be the minimal length required to travel from i to j. The mean path
length is the average of these geodesic distances which is charactersitically small (typically
on the order of logN) for small-world networks (Watts & Strogatz 1998). Figure 4 depicts
6
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Figure 3: The frequency of each possible vertex degree for strategic societies compared to the baseline
Baraba´si-Albert model. The horizontal line shows where the models would equate.
the dependence of a system’s mean stability on the various possible mean path lengths
(for there is a discrete spectrum of the latter). A robust negative correlation is found,
implying that low-diameter networks are better suited on average to support equilibrium
“like” ensembles.
The final structural network feature to be examined is clustering, ie. the tendency of
those who share mutual friends to be adjacent. Mean local clustering is defined as follows
in the manner of Watts and Strogatz. For a given vertex labeled i, let the local clustering
coefficient be the proportion of potential connections between its “friends” which are in
fact edges of the graph. The mean clustering is the mean of these local coefficients across
all nodes i. As in the previous section, we plot the effect of the clustering coefficient on
the stability of the system, shown in Figure 5. We find that the resulting scatter plot is in
fact partitioned into approximately eight near-exponential series, perhaps corresponding
to some discrete structural feature of the network. The overall negative trend indicates
that clustering does not tend to promote strategic “like” rate equilibria.
It is not lost on the author that these three global metrics are mutually dependent,
particularly when computed for such small communities. It is therefore prudent to deter-
mine which of the identified relations are truly due to variation in the explanatory variable
and which exist only because the explanatory variable correlates strongly with another
factor. To this end we regress the system’s stability to a logistic function against the
three variables examined in this section using a damped least-squares method.6 The fit-
ted coefficients for preferential attachment, mean path length, and mean local clustering
are respectively 0.0973, −0.2757, and −0.0113. All three trends have signs as observed in
isolation so we need not qualitatively modify our conclusion. However, the effect of clus-
6Preferential attachment is quantified as the standard deviation of the graph’s degree distribution and
the other variables are defined as before.
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Figure 4: Effect of the graph’s mean degree of separation on the stability of the (R,G) system.
tering can be almost entirely accounted for by variation in the presence of the scale-free
and small-world properties.
It is important that we clarify how the results of this section can be interpreted. It is
tempting to infer that graphs which underlie stable systems are themselves stable when
subject to the addition and deletion of edges according to some consent rule.7 However,
recalling the formulation of the simulation, we tested the system’s sensitivity with respect
to perturbations of only the rate matrix, not the network itself. This does not invalidate
the results; it merely highlights a necessary consequence of the implicit assumption that
the matrix is fixed and agents have control over only their “like” rates. We must then
understand the results of this section as describing which network features tend to support
strategic rate ensembles. For an extreme example as to why this distinction matters, con-
sider the star graph with N = 10; that is, the graph with a single hub adjacent to each of
the other nine nodes which are all mutually unconnected. Based on the positive correla-
tion identified between the standard deviation of the degree distribution and the system’s
stability, it is reasonable to assume that stars have a propensity to support equilibrium
ensembles. Indeed, it is found via simulation with the same parameters that 10-stars are
on average 26.3% more stable than the subset of Baraba´si-Albert-generated networks with
a hub of order 9 (which cannot contain stars due to the nature of the algorithm), which
is already the most stable class identified (see Figure 3). However, among the 1% most
strategic star graphs, the branches have average likedness centrality of nearly three times
that of the hub. The consequence for the system’s stability is independent of the choice
of Bala and Goyal’s or Jackson and Watts’ consent model. In either case, the hub has
both incentive and permission to defect from the star, thus creating an isolated node with
a likedness centrality of zero (by convention) and inflating its own prestige. We must
7Depending on the particular online community being studied, one might assume either a unilateral
(Bala & Goyal 2000) or mutual (Jackson & Watts 2002) consent model for the alteration of the graph’s
edges. We disallow both here, but a future direction may involve easing this restriction to search for Nash
equilibria in the action space of graphs for a given rate matrix.
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Figure 5: Effect of the graph’s mean local clustering on the stability of the (R,G) system.
conclude that even in this simple example, a system that is in Nash equilibrium over the
action space of rate ensembles need not be stable when subjected to perturbations of the
underlying network.
VII. Conclusion
We return to our motivating question as to the incentive system driving the exchange of
gratification in online social networks. The Facebook “like” and its counterparts elsewhere
on the web, though desired and arbitrarily abundant, are traded as though they are scarce
and may therefore permit an economic solution for the problem of their allocation. Here
we studied a strictly strategic explanation which established likedness centrality as the
effective utility function that social agents seek to maximize. We have seen that acting
accordingly, systems of rational agents find equilibria at plausible finite rates of “liking,”
indicating that strategic behavior may play a role in the individual’s decision process. We
acknowledge that one would be na¨ıve and excessively cynical to assert that this manner of
Machiavellian reasoning is the only impetus behind the allocation of social gratification;
it should be expected that the many other motivations identified in the literature and
enumerated in the Introduction are also relevant. Nonetheless, the framework provided
here may serve as the basis for a more exhaustive model of users’ incentives. One might,
for instance, consider a hybrid model akin to that of Jackson and Rogers (2007) whereby
agents randomly decide at each iteration whether to maximize their likedness centrality
or behave non-strategically. Then, carrying out the simulation for various probabilities,
one can determine for a given application the relative prevalence of strategic versus non-
strategic decision-making. New insights on social media use may emerge as it becomes
possible to determine the degree to which particular societies and the individuals within
them are driven by the pursuit of social capital.
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The author is eternally grateful to Artur Filipowicz of Princeton University’s Department
of Operations Research and Financial Engineering for prioritizing revision and our useful
discussions, even while they were neglected by our otherwise-engaged colleagues.
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